Mozambique’s Election Militancy

January 20th, 2025

Justin Palazzolo

Mozambique has never been a country synonymous with stability. After all, who can forget when the nation defaulted on hidden debts created by a corruption scandal over illicit “tuna bonds”. However, with the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025, Mozambique has become a nation on the brink.

In October 2024, national elections were held where the ruling Frelimo party exited with 77% of the national vote. However, the primary opposition candidate to Frelimo’s Daniel Chapo, former pastor Venacio Mondlane, cited widespread accusations of electoral fraud within the outcome, a pattern for an authoritarian Frelimo party that has long used force to hold its grip on power.

However, since the election, violence has reached a fever pitch as Chapo’s inauguration approaches. In totality, over 300 civilians have been killed by Mozambique’s security forces as nearly every single population center experiences protests and riots over the allegations of electoral fraud.

Despite the timing, the current outburst of violence and unrest has been long simmering over underlying issues within Mozambique. Soaring inflation in fuel, food, clothing, and electric houses has pushed over a million of the country’s population into extreme poverty. What’s more telling is that 60 percent of this population lives in the same urban centers that are experiencing mass unrest.

The reason why these economic issues have translated into violence is due to the public sentiment of distrust regarding the government’s ability to solve the crisis. Mozambique’s once-booming economy was halted in 2016 when the aforementioned “tuna bond” scandal exposed the government for secretly taking on 2 billion dollars of commercial loan debt causing an IMF pullout and a complete default on Mozambique’s debt. Since then, the reality of extensive Frelimo corruption has become common knowledge among the populace, leading to a voter base who rightfully believes that a government that embezzled over 405 million meticais within the first half of 2024 alone is unable to solve the nation’s economic crisis.

Furthermore, a systemic distrust of the government’s mishandling of the Islamist militancy within the Cabo Delgado province of northern Mozambique has also been an indictment in the court of public opinion. Since 2017, Al Shabaab has intensified jihadist attacks within the province. Crucially they’ve found a recruiting foothold within the area’s Mweni ethnic group who feel politically and economically marginalized by the surrounding Makonde and Makua peoples who hold more power in government and business.

In response to the growing crisis, Mozambique’s security forces have been unable to find a consistent strategy. After the regional SADC withdrew its SAMIM mission, Mozambique’s government has looked to private military corporations such as Russia’s Wagner as well as regional actors such as Rwanda for military intervention. However, this completely disjointed approach has led to a complete absence of progress from both domestic security forces and outside actors in defeating Al Shabaab.

In short, trust is absent among voters in Mozambique in the current Frelimo party to handle the issues that have become systemic in their multi-decade hold on power. The prospect of voter fraud has led massive portions of the disaffected to lash out against what they see as a hopeless system.

As long as Mozambique’s government embodies the same Frelimo-dominated ruling class, the country's current state of unrest will also remain the status quo.