South Sudan on the Brink

April 14th, 2025

Justin Palazzolo

From December 2013 to August 2018, the state of South Sudan was seen as the most common and clear example of a failed state. In 2013, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir accused Vice President Riek Machar of attempting a coup. Quickly, the government split apart along ethnic lines, with Kiir siding with his ethnic group, the Dinka, and with Machar aligning with the Nuer ethnic group.

After years of mass ethnic cleansing, sexual violence, and over 400,000 deaths, the parties were able to achieve a ceasefire and end the conflict. Now, in 2025, the exact same two people responsible for pushing their nation to the brink are doing it again.

On March 7th of this year, Machar was arrested by Kiir once again on the exact same charges of planning an insurrection and a regime change in South Sudan. This crisis originated when the White Army Militia, a group that sided with Machar during the original civil conflict, attacked an army base in the Upper Nile Region. This once again pits the Machar-affiliated Nuer militias against Kiir and his unity government that was formed by the 2018 treaty that reunified both Kiir and Machar under one ‘unity’ government.

The current outbreak of violence and the arrest of Machar are proof of the failings of the 2018 peace deal. The promised de-arming and demobilization of numerous militia groups never took place as political and ethnic groups protected each other to preserve their armed influence. The White Army being able to launch the attack it did earlier this year is proof of that, since the militia had more than enough arms, manpower, and equipment to launch a large-scale attack on an army base that militias like the White Army were supposed to join post-war.

Naturally, with the gaping failures of the 2018 peace deal being made clear in recent months, the dialogue around South Sudan’s future focuses on whether a return to war is unavoidable. With the numerous active ethnic militias in South Sudan, the recent arrest of Machar is so inflammatory that conflict will break out between these groups. Even if Machar is unable to run a unified front against the government in Juba due to his imprisonment, there are numerous militant groups willing to fight on his behalf and along ethnic divisions, essentially making a return to violence certain, even if the magnitude of a re-emergent conflict is unknown.

Extemp Analysis By Justin Palazzolo

Q: Will the current government in South Sudan avoid a civil war in 2025?

A: Obviously, when answering this question, you begin by asking whether a war will objectively happen in 2025 in South Sudan and then tie the government’s involvement to either futility or effectiveness to justify this claim. Since the ground for answering this question optimistically is so limited, we will focus on the NO ground for answering this question.

AGD: Begin by using a story of someone impacted in a severe way by the first South Sudanese Civil War, and then tie in through your link the prospect of the war restarting to draw the judge into the importance of the topic.

Background: Basic context about the arrest of Machar and the White Army Militia needs to be established to familiarize the judge with the elements causing violence in South Sudan.

Significance Statement: Considering… (insert quantification on how many people would be affected by bringing in prior war statistics)

Example Points:

P1: Militias are still armed and rampant.

P2: Reemergence of ethnic tensions.

P3: Machar loyalists will form a separatist government.

P1 Example

A: The 2018 peace agreement failed in achieving disarmament- militias are still active and can wage conflict.

B: The Arrest of Machar forces militias to take sides and realign with the groups they allied with during the first civil conflict.

C: The government in Juba has no checks on militias, so war is inevitable and then impacting.

In addition to having ample ground for analysis on the NO side of the question, there is also the opportunity to lean heavily into rhetoric to involve the reality of the conflict viscerally in the mind of the judge. Making the prospect of a new conflict as raw and personal as possible can improve your chances of having your judge regard your speech as notable, even in a competitive room.