The U.S. Occupation of Venezuela, Seven Months In

Blake McFalls — July 28, 2026

2026 began with one of the most shocking moves of President Donald Trump’s second term. On January 3rd, the U.S. military conducted a secret operation in Venezuela, capturing president Nicolás Maduro and declaring de facto rule over the country. Upon bringing Venezuela under U.S. rule, the Trump administration promised political and economic liberalization, as well as a return to stability. Now, over seven months after the American occupation began, it is important to evaluate what progress, if any, has been made to fulfill these promises. To fully understand the current situation in Venezuela, we must examine the long history of U.S.-Venezuela relations and analyze the complex factors that have driven conflict between the two countries for decades.

Hugo Chavez and the United States

While the current occupation of Venezuela certainly serves as a defining moment in U.S.-Venezuela relations, the tension between the two countries did not begin in 2026. In fact, the United States has long resented Venezuela’s government, much of which has to do with former Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez.

Chavez took power in 1999 on a promise to root out corruption by implementing a socialist revolution. His 14-year rule permanently transformed Venezuela. At face value, Chavez was true to his goals. In 2003, he launched numerous social programs called Bolivarian Missions that provided education, healthcare, and more to Venezuelans. Chavez consistently won elections and referendums, supposedly as a result of these programs. Beneath the surface, however, Chavez was not a liberator like his proclaimed idol, Simon Bolivar; rather, he was an authoritarian.

In 2002, one million Venezuelans protested Chavez’s corrupt appointments of political allies, yet “chavistas,” supporters of Chavez, met them with violence. Following the protests, Chavez suspended the constitution and began to implement other stringent measures. According to a 2008 Human Rights Watch report, Chavez’s regime suppressed civil society and independent media. Venezuela’s elections were not yet subject to ballot-stuffing, but their government was quickly turning into a “hybrid regime,” concerning democracy-conscious figures like U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Aside from democracy concerns, many of Chavez’s actions directly undermined U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere. Chavez consolidated PDVSA — the state-owned oil company — into a political tool, allowing his regime to wrestle control of Venezuela’s oil fields away from private actors. This reduced the powers of U.S. oil companies over the Venezuelan oil sector, a trend that would intensify in the 2010s. In 2007, Chavez seized the assets of U.S. oil companies operating in Venezuela, such as ExxonMobil and Conoco Phillips. Finally, Chavez aligned himself with American adversaries such as Russia, Iran, and China, bringing an increasingly powerful anti-American axis to the U.S.’ hemisphere.

The Rise of Nicolás Maduro

Following Chavez’s untimely death in 2013, Nicolás Maduro — his chosen successor — narrowly won an election over a popular opposition to be elected president. Chavez’s use of PDVSA to generate oil revenue and fund social programs entrenched oil as the centerpiece of the Venezuelan economy; by 2014, oil accounted for 95% of Venezuela’s oil exports. Such a dependency works when oil prices are high and sustained, as was the case under Chavez. Unfortunately for Maduro and Venezuelans, however, oil prices plummeted by 38% in 2014, destroying the preeminent outlet of economic prosperity and government revenue.

Lacking an alternative source of national income, Maduro’s government resorted to printing money, quickly bringing inflation to 60%. After 2014, Venezuela would be plagued with a cycle of popular dissent and counterproductive economic policy. Chavez’s prior mismanagement of PDVSA — brought about through a focus on politics — rendered an oil sector recovery nearly impossible. Still, the oil sector’s lowest point was not 2014, but rather five years later. In 2019, Venezuela’s inflation rate peaked at 345,000%. Maduro’s economic decisions angered Venezuelans, millions of which were pushed into poverty. Conditions became so precarious that over eight million Venezuelans were forced to flee the country.

Following a highly contentious election in 2018, Maduro secured a narrow victory and continued his reign. Global watchdogs suspected ballot-stuffing, but even without direct electoral fixing, the election was too heavily tampered with to be considered legitimate. Namely, Maduro banned parties, violated anti-corruption laws to coerce voters, and used the Supreme Tribunal to appoint allies to the National Electoral Council.

Nicolás Maduro and the United States

Unlike Chavez, Maduro faced serious external issues. On top of destroying the lives of Venezuelans, Maduro’s regime alienated the Obama and Trump administrations, leading to respective sanctions in 2015 and 2019. Obama-era sanctions froze the assets of specific PDVSA officials in response to human rights abuses, while Trump-era sanctions took larger steps to dismantle what remained of Venezuela’s oil sector by banning PDVSA access to the U.S. market.

In 2023, the Biden administration struck a deal with Maduro’s government. The U.S. would suspend sanctions on Venezuela on the condition that Venezuela hosted free and fair elections in 2024. The time period between October 2023 and July 2024 was an inflection point for U.S.-Venezuela relations; Venezuela would either choose rapprochement with the U.S., or permanent disintegration of trust between the two countries.

Maduro chose the latter. The 2024 elections not only involved the jailing of popular democratic figure Maria Corina Machado, but blatant ballot-stuffing, proven by Machado’s allies. The U.S. quickly resumed its sanctions on Venezuela as the Venezuelan people protested the government in droves. Maduro responded with defiance and suppression, killing at least 24 protesters and jailing thousands. Damage to the U.S.-Venezuela relationship was irreparable.

The Trump administration decided that sanctions weren’t enough. In late 2025, Trump conducted dozens of strikes in the Caribbean, sinking supposed drug boats tied to Maduro’s regime. During this time, the U.S. drastically expanded its naval presence in the Caribbean and off the coast of Venezuela, threatening the country while gathering intelligence. Using these assets, the U.S. succeeded in its overnight operation against Maduro, capturing him and flying him to New York.

U.S. Governance of Venezuela

The U.S. declared it would run Venezuela for the foreseeable future, seeking numerous changes in the country. Primarily, the U.S. aimed to reopen Venezuela’s oil market to the U.S. and the rest of the world. Some estimates value Venezuela’s oil reserves at $17 trillion. Harnessing these reserves could have numerous implications for the U.S. First, the data center boom in the U.S. threatens to raise electricity prices across the country, an issue President Trump has been particularly concerned about as of late. According to the Trump administration, accessing Venezuela’s reserves would help Americans amidst the change, as a larger supply of energy would lower energy costs. Second, domestic oil refiners could vastly benefit. Much of the U.S.’ refining infrastructure, specifically along the Gulf Coast, was built for heavy and sour crude oil, but since the shale boom, a rising share of U.S. oil production is made of light and sweet crude. Luckily for refiners such as Valero and Chevron, Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt has predominantly heavy and sour crude, maximizing existing U.S. infrastructure.

Aside from economic gains, the U.S. has sought political change in Venezuela. Democratic collapse is a part of the story; the reason behind Trump’s 2019 sanctions was Maduro’s election-rigging. However, a larger political change the U.S. has sought is the removal of adversaries from the Western Hemisphere. Maduro maintained highly friendly relations with Russia and China, causing the Trump administration to suspect foreign military and intelligence presence in Venezuela. The Trump administration used this suspicion as justification for the intervention, prompting outlets to dub Trump’s posture in the Western Hemisphere as the “Donroe Doctrine.”

Days after the intervention, Trump appointed Delcy Rodriguez, Maduro’s VP and former energy minister, as interim president of Venezuela. This left many confused, and not just because of her role in Maduro’s regime. Rodriguez is also the daughter of Jorge Antonio Rodriguez, a prominent Marxist guerrilla leader whose political career had its philosophical foundations in chavismo — Chavez’s form of socialism so despised by the U.S. Just recently, Trump had to ask a Miami court to pardon Rodriguez on counts of human rights abuses.

Still, Trump’s decision to appoint Rodriguez to the interim presidency is not all-that-surprising. Hours after Maduro’s capture, U.S. officials met with Rodriguez to set the guidelines for her presidency. Since January, she has utilized her understanding of Venezuela’s political system to implement the requests of the U.S. government. Rodriguez has also shown symbolic support for political change by ousting senior officials of the government and the military. Although the replacements were also substantial players in Maduro’s former regime, Rodriguez has displayed her willingness to disrupt the status quo if it means acknowledging the chain of command.

One of the Trump administration’s first demands was the release of political prisoners jailed under Maduro’s rule. In February, Rodriguez partially followed through on this request, releasing thousands of prisoners. While this was a step in the right direction, hundreds of political prisoners, including 187 servicemen accused of treason under Maduro, remain behind bars. This reflects the general story of U.S. governance in Venezuela: partial progress toward change, but not quite enough.

Democracy in Venezuela

A request from international observers has been a return to democracy. Edmundo Gonzalez, a candidate who ran in Machado’s stead in 2024, rightly won the election. Of course, this was heavily contested in 2024 due to the government’s rejection of the proper results. While these disputes legally necessitate a new election, the Trump administration does not seem to be making progress toward holding elections. Instead, the U.S. aims to establish stability first and foremost. When elections are held, Machado will likely win over Rodriguez, but for now, Rodriguez will remain in power.

The U.S. and Venezuelan Oil

The revitalization of Venezuela’s oil sector is a challenge more in the hands of the U.S. and its private companies than the Venezuelan government. Much of Venezuela’s oil sector collapse was of the government’s own doing, but U.S. sanctions poured salt on the wound by limiting Venezuela’s capacity to export the oil it produced. The situation, however, has become more complex than the U.S. simply removing sanctions. The U.S. must decide which companies should operate in Venezuela, how former chavismo expropriations should be reconciled, and most pressing, how Venezuela’s crippled oil infrastructure should be repaired.

One of the Trump administration’s major moves was creating an informal licensing system. Similar to how the Biden administration allowed Chevron to export Venezuelan oil despite sanctions, the Trump administration is giving U.S. companies limited access to Venezuela’s oil sector. In February, the Treasury Department identified certain companies — mostly those who previously operated in Venezuela — that could negotiate with PDVSA over potential oil exploration and refining contracts. In April, the USDT’s Office on Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) created new licenses to more directly engage with Venezuelan institutions outside of PDVSA, such as Venezuelan banks. OFAC’s spree of spring licenses were general licenses, meaning unlike initial licenses, unspecified U.S. companies could obtain them.

The U.S. is keen on producing an impact through the alleviation of sanctions. In fact, the Trump administration, often alongside oil executives, has frequently cooperated with the Venezuelan government in creating mutual guidelines for U.S. private entry into Venezuela’s oil sector through memorandums of understanding (MOUs). This dialogue has had two strategic impacts. First, it puts the Venezuelan government on board with the U.S.’ vision for Venezuela. Second, it alleviates concerns oil companies have previously had about entering Venezuela by involving executives in bilateral discussions.

To some extent, the U.S. is achieving its goals in Venezuela. Venezuela’s oil exports passed one million barrels per day (bpd) in April, largely driven by Chevron’s growing presence. Chevron alone accounted for 293,000 bpd of exports in quarter two of 2026, up from 223,000 in quarter one. Beyond oil companies expanding exploration and refining projects, the private sector is facilitating Venezuela’s entry into the international oil market. Trading houses, which match oil producers with foreign buyers, have overseen the sale of 100 million barrels of Venezuelan oil. The role of trading houses such as Vitol and Trafigura — companies located in other continents — has become so influential that U.S. refiners are seeking to seize it for themselves.

Many challenges still remain before U.S. companies fully renew operations in Venezuela. Aside from needing over $100 billion in infrastructure repair, Venezuela’s oil sector has a terrible reputation; the government’s seizure of U.S. oil company assets under Chavez have made U.S. companies afraid to dip their feet into the oil sector again. Just as the U.S.-Venezuela partnership was trying to address this, tragedy struck.

The Earthquakes and the Challenges They Present

In late June, Venezuela was ravaged with two large strike-slip earthquakes, which left 5,278 dead and thousands more injured and displaced. The recovery effort has been hampered by unfortunate circumstances. On one hand, Venezuela stored its $4 billion in gold bars in the Bank of England in case of a disaster, yet the UK has yet to hand the assets over. Furthermore, Rodriguez’s government was anything but responsive following the earthquake, and U.S. ground support was equally as sluggish. U.S. power company General Electric agreed to repair the Venezuelan grid, damaged by the earthquakes, along with years of mismanagement and underdevelopment, but recovery will likely take more than one company. The earthquakes present yet another risk for American oil companies looking to invest in the already precarious situation in Venezuela.

Conclusion

The story of a U.S.-run Venezuela has been one of partial recovery. American companies are beginning to enter Venezuela, but on metrics that regard the prosperity of Venezuelans, the U.S. has fallen short. Now, over two years since the country’s rigged presidential election, Venezuela has no promise of democratic resurgence. Venezuelans continue to feel the pain of the earthquake that only added to their struggles from chavismo. Still, it has only been seven months, so it is highly possible that in the years to come, Venezuelans will actually enjoy the fruits of Maduro’s ouster, rather than just a different side of the same authoritarian coin.